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C Y B E R T A X*
After Faraday discovered the basic principle of electromagnetic induction in 1831, a sceptical
politician asked him what this was good for. Faraday responded: “Sir, I do not know what it is
good for. However, of one thing I am quite certain, some day you will tax it.”
Luc Soete  and Bas ter Weel**    ***
Internet, the fastest growing communications medium or consumer electronic technology,
doubles its size every six months. Within a few years the number of citizens in Cyberspace
will outnumber all but the largest nations. The borderless world of the Internet extends its
reach to all corners of the world. Best of all, it is almost free. Hardware costs aside, once
on the Internet a user can surf anywhere for the price of a local phone call. But what about
all the foregone tax revenue that electronic commerce could facilitate? Although Internet
commerce is in its earliest stages, its rapid growth is anticipated. Some estimate that in
thirty years time, consumer activity online could represent more than thirty percent of total
consumer activity. This leads to the erosion of national tax bases. In this paper we show
that as a measure of last resort the bit tax can be implemented. Although the exact
implementation of such a tax is not yet clear, the general idea of a tax on information from
the point of view of an eroding tax base and the changing society is certainly worth
considering. Furthermore, the tax revenues could be directed towards improving access to
the Internet, educating individuals to become acquainted with the Internet and providing
additional needed bandwidth.
* This paper is a revised version of MERIT Research Memorandum 97-019.
** Department of Economics and Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology
(MERIT), Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, the Netherlands; Tel. 0031-43-
3883874; E-mail: luc.soete@algec.unimaas.nl.
*** Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT), Maastricht University,
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, the Netherlands; Tel. 0031-43-3883873; E-mail:
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2Introduction
The emerging Information Society (IS), characterised by rapid change and high degrees of
flexibility, will require considerable adjustments by workers, firms, and governments.  Growth1
in productivity, output and jobs must be built on a comprehensive foundation of technological
progress and the development of human capital. Coherent policies must therefore create
incentives for expanded investment in human capital, technology, innovation and information
networks. Government policies must nurture this society and promote the adjustment towards
the new era of the IS.  To achieve this formidable goal, policies must create an environment in2
which each individual is provided with the skills and tools to participate in this new society.  In3
their report “Global Information Infrastructure -- Global Information Society (GII-GIS): Policy
Requirements” the Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy
recognises these radical changes when they state:
“Industrial economies are at the threshold of potentially radical structural
changes in their economic structures. Communication networks and interactive
multimedia applications are providing the foundation for the transformation of
existing social and economic relationships into an “information society”. Such
an information society is viewed as resulting in a paradigm shift in industrial
structures and social relations, much as the industrial revolution transformed the
then agrarian societies ... The development of an information society is expected
to have important beneficial impacts on economies and society; it is expected to
stimulate economic growth and productivity, create new economic activities and
jobs. Unlike other technological changes, the rapid developments and diffusion
3of communication and information technologies and the emergence of interactive
multimedia applications have the potential to affect all economic sectors,
organisational and work structures, public services, cultural and social
activities.” (p. 5)
In the rapid evolution towards an IS the telecommunications market plays an important and
decisive role by selling and creating the means to communicate, i.e. bandwidth. In this rapidly
growing market bandwidth is usually sold on a timed basis - calls are billed based on the length
of the call - while many leased lines and data lines are sold at a fixed price. However, while
bandwidth capacity is increasing dramatically, it is highly doubtful that capacity growth can keep
up with demand growth. The number of people who have acquired an Internet connection is
doubling every year, while bandwidth is certainly not.  In other words, key resources are and will4
remain scarce for the next twenty years. The most serious question will be how to allocate the
scarce resources of the Internet.
Economics is the study of resource allocation problems. The standard economic answer in this
regard is to create markets and let prices allocate the scarce resources. However, the economic
answer with respect to the Internet is not as straightforward as many economists might think.
Currently, information is provided to the Internet user at a fixed price, regardless of the value of
that information to particular users. If the information value is high to the consumer, e.g.
downloading the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics’ online database for a project at work, the
same is amount is paid as acquiring information for entertainment purposes, e.g. downloading
pictures of Pamela Anderson. This point alludes to the difficulties and challenges associated with
pricing information downloaded from the Internet.  Several authors have addressed the problem
4of how to appropriately price the Internet.  At this stage, however, their models remain highly5
theoretical and their recommendations cannot be implemented either because of lack of
knowledge and skills on the side of scientists or because of an unwillingness on the side of
‘popular’ politicians. The real answer to the problem of Internet pricing might come from the
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the financial world.6
In Europe, the High Level Expert Group on the Social Aspects of the Information Society
(HLEG) has called for reflection and research on alternative taxation systems. One feasible
approach they suggest is a bit tax. Such a tax may be a tool for governments to consider in an
increasingly information-based world in which value is generated through systems and global
networks, instead of through clearly identifiable material production and exchange, i.e.
intangibles versus tangibles.  Soete and Kamp (1996) and (1997a) elaborate further on the idea7
suggesting research and an improved understanding of the taxation issues related to electronic
commerce.8
This paper discusses the case of taxing cyberspace and develops the case in favour of a tax on
electronic commerce. We proceed in the following manner. In Section 2 we sketch a picture of
consumer behaviour towards the IS in general and the Internet in particular by discussing the ex
ante conditions consumers demand in order to enter the IS and/ or the Internet. First, we deal
with buying decisions and show that Europeans have a comparative disadvantage compared to
US consumers. Then, we investigate access issues to show the ‘IS literacy’ of the population and
tax implications. Thereafter, in Section 3, we explain the philosophy behind taxing electronic
commerce. Then, we construct a business model to illustrate how the various players profit from
the Internet. In assessing and collecting tax from transactions on the Internet this is an important
5exercise. This business model is useful in showing different monetary flows that occur when a
consumer purchases a product from the Internet. Hence, by using this model  we can identify the
taxing possibilities; we propose three different ways to tax electronic commerce. We end with
some concluding remarks.
6Accessing the information society
Buying decision
One argument in opposing taxing the IS is the (further) creation of a two-tier society.  Once9
information is priced it will become hard for individuals without an Internet connection to obtain
one. In other words, by taxing the Internet we could create information ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’.
In order to see whether this argument is valid we look at the buying decisions of individuals with
regard to a new product and we investigate the number of Internet users and their behaviour by
presenting figures on the number of users and the number of hosts. 
The central issue with regard to access to the Internet is: what are the factors that determine the
use and or purchase of this innovative good? First, we need to define the buying decision. Is it
the decision of a ‘computer-less’ individual to buy a Personal Computer (PC) with an Internet
connection or is it the decision of an individual who already has a computer to buy a modem in
order to obtain an Internet connection? To see the validity of this question we introduce Table
2.1. This table shows the number PCS and the number of Compact Disc - Read Only Memory
(CD-ROM) players in the European Union.  From Table 2.1 we observe that the number of PCS10
is by approximation twice as large as the number of CD-ROM players in Belgium, Germany and
the Netherlands and that it exceeds this ratio by far in the other EU-countries. Looking at the
number of households with a PC, we observe that in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden
approximately 25 percent of households have a PC. In Belgium, France, Greece and Italy the
rates are 15, 15, 10 and 14 percent, respectively. If we compare these findings with the
percentage of households with a CD-ROM player we observe that matters become worse. Under
the assumption that the number of CD-ROM players equals the number of modems, only a
7percentage of less than 10 of the EU population is ‘Internet literate’. Thus, currently the
percentage of ‘have nots’ in the EU is approximately 90% of the all households.
Table 2.1: Number of PCS and CD-ROM players in the European Union, 01/01/1996
Country Number of PCS Households with a Number of CD- Households with a
PC (%) ROM Players CD-ROM Player
(%)
Belgium 585.000 15 273.000 7
Denmark 720.000 24 270.000 9
France 3.300.000 15 1.320.000 6
Germany 4.940.000 19 2.860.000 11
Greece 350.000 10 105.000 3
Italy 2.800.000 14 1.200.000 6
Netherlands 1.525.000 25 610.000 10
Spain 2.415.000 21 805.000 7
Sweden 945.000 27 315.000 9
UK 4.400.000 20 1.540.000 7
Total EU-10 21.980.000 19 9.298.000 8
Source: RIPE (1997)
What determines the buying decision of an individual? Five factors can be identified that play
a role in the minds of potential purchasers of innovative goods. These factors are: comparative
advantage, complexity, compatibility, diffusion and communication.  With respect to11
comparative advantage, an individual examines whether a PC with an Internet connection
provides any added value. Currently, newspapers, television and radio are the most used media
to collect information from. People are acquainted with these media and are satisfied with their
performance and many are not willing to adapt to use the Internet. In addition, the fees charged
by ISPs are for many a barrier to access the Internet. Table 2.2 shows the ranking of ISP charges
in US$PPP in 1995. From this table we observe that the cost of accessing the Internet are the
lowest in Australia, the UK, the US, New Zealand, Canada, Finland and the Netherlands, both
in nominal terms and as a percentage of GDP per capita. It is not surprising that the more
8developed countries charge the least, since their electronic infrastructure is best developed. In
terms of GDP per capita, Mexico and Turkey are the worst off on this measure with an Internet
connection costing over 1 percent of their GDP per capita. Surprisingly, EU countries such as
Germany, Italy, Belgium and Denmark also charge high prices for an Internet connection. 
Table 2.2: Ranking Internet Access Provider Charges (Dial-Up), 1995
Country 20 Hours per 30 Hours per Average Charge Average
Month Month Charge/GDP per
 US$PPP  US$PPP US$PPP
US$PPP Capita 
Australia 10.45 16.54 13.49 0.071
UK 14.67 14.67 14.67 0.075
New Zealand 15.26 15.26 15.26 0.093
Finland 18.85 18.85 18.85 0.106
USA 20.64 20.64 20.64 0.077
Netherlands 21.13 21.13 21.13 0.106
Canada 15.96 27.96 21.96 0.104
Iceland 24.35 24.35 24.35 0.119
Sweden 25.10 25.10 25.10 0.135
Spain 35.10 35.10 35.10 0.242
Norway 35.69 53.07 44.38 0.202
Switzerland 46.95 55.95 51.45 0.199
Portugal 42.25 67.25 54.75 0.432
Austria 59.32 59.32 59.32 0.279
Japan 53.04 86.19 69.61 0.315
France 61.37 91.39 76.38 0.363
Greece 77.39 77.39 77.39 0.661
Mexico 80.41 80.41 80.41 1.256
Denmark 67.48 99.64 83.56 0.394
Turkey 72.97 117.97 95.47 1.711
Italy 79.08 117.82 98.45 0.495
Belgium 108.36 108.36 108.36 0.500
Germany 118.06 162.09 135.08 0.673
Ireland 153.49 153.49 153.49 0.979
Luxembourg 154.65 154.65 154.65 0.414
OECD 67.35 83.94 75.65 0.400
Source: Sanz and Salvador (1997), Worldbank (1997)
Most individuals find it still too complicated to use a PC. This leads us to the second factor:
complexity. An individual asks himself whether he can become easily acquainted with a PC and
9the Internet. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is in almost all cases certainly negative.
A PC is for most individuals a very complicated ‘thing’ to deal with, let alone the Internet which
makes intensive use of an individual’s computer skills. This leads us to the third factor:
compatibility. Hereby we mean the extent to which the Internet fits into an individual’s personal
life. At this stage it seems safe to conclude that most individuals are not yet part of the IS. This
is due to the high costs involved in purchasing a PC with a possible Internet connection, a so-
called Multimedia PC. This brings us to our fourth factor, the factor of diffusion. People can only
become acquainted with the Internet if they can buy a Multimedia PC easily. This is currently not
the case since such a computer is relatively expensive and costs over two thousand US Dollars.
Finally, we turn our attention to the factor of communication. This is perhaps the most important
one, because it makes individuals aware of the greater utility associated with using the Internet.12
This may sound logical, but history has proven that many high-tech goods failed because of lack
of communication with the potential customers - potential customers were unaware of the
innovative qualities of the product - and because of a lack of skills by consumers. This is an
essential point in the further growth of the Internet in particular and the IS in general, and gives
governments an opportunity to carry out their educational programmes focussing on computer
skills on the one hand and the efficient gathering of information on the other. However, it is
crucial to acknowledge that in the emerging IS the learning process does not take place at school
or work only. Learning through consumption might be one of the most important ways to become
familiar with the Internet.13
10
Access to electronic networks
Access to the Internet can be viewed as a ‘ticket’ to enter the IS. This access is often viewed as
essential for individuals to gain in the coming years. In this section we elaborate on the rapid
evolution and growth of the Internet. We also show that the growth in the number of individuals
entering the Internet falls from over 100 percent in the early nineties to approximately 80 percent
in the near future. Table 2.3 shows the number of hosts in the world. From this table we observe
that by approximation the number of hosts doubles every year. However, in the first half of 1997
we see a dramatic fall in the growth rate. The figures until July 1997 show a growth rate of  21%
for the US, 23% for Europe and an even worse scenario for the other countries: 20% growth until
July 1997, whereas growth rates of over one hundred percent were the standard in the early
nineties.
Table 2.3: Number of Hosts in the World, 1993-1997
01/01/93 01/01/94 01/01/95 01/01/96 01/01/97 01/07/97 (Y /Y )97 93 1/T
-1
USA 942.693 1.475.422 3.178.266 6.053.402 10.695.092 12.849.392 0.8353
Europe 303.828 587.135 1.106.077 2.284.750 3.921.946 4.840.248 0.8955
Other 66.479 66.479 154.443 567.657 1.528.962 1.850.360 1.1899
Total 1.313.000 2.129.036 4.438.786 8.905.809 16.460.000 19.540.000 0.8817
Source: Network Wizard (1997), RIPE (1997)
In Table 2.4, we observe an even worse scenario for the EU countries. In the first half of 1997
the number of Internet hosts in Austria and Portugal has actually fallen below the level of
December 1996, whereas the growth rates for the other countries are marginal compared to the
growth rates of more than 100% from 1981 to 1996.
11
Many predict a further slowdown of the growth rate. This observation is perfectly in line with
the fact that it is difficult for an ordinary individual to access the Internet due to the high costs
involved. Multimedia PCS are available in the US for less than US$ 1.000, about twice as much
as in Europe. This contributes to a European household penetration rate of 15%, less than half
the US figure. To lower the threshold of gaining access to the Internet, prices of PCS should drop
by close to one hundred percent in order to give Europeans the chance to gain access to the
Internet.
Table 2.4: Number of Hosts in the European Union, 1993-1997
Country 01/01/93 01/01/94 01/01/95 01/01/96 01/01/97 01/07/97 (Y /Y )97 93 1/T
-1
Austria 9.286 12.587 28.928 60.320 91.938 87.408 0.7738
Belgium 1.658 7.544 19.065 31.920 64.670 86.117 1.4991
Denmark 5.383 8.703 27.348 52.536 106.476 137.008 1.1089
Finland 19.606 35.705 71.639 230.473 283.526 335.956 0.9501
France 25.719 56.675 94.112 145.830 245.201 292.096 0.7572
Germany 66.043 120.034 209.268 467.024 721.847 875.631 0.8183
Greece 699 1.935 4.030 9.111 15.925 19.711 1.1847
Ireland 1.284 2.330 6.327 13.688 27.059 33.031 1.1426
Italy 8.725 18.027 32.334 78.255 149.595 211.966 1.0349
Netherlands 25.217 44.917 89.279 177.050 270.521 341.560 0.8098
Portugal 1.901 3.382 5.521 12.698 26.077 18.147 0.9245
Spain 6.578 15.155 27.040 56.604 110.041 121.823 1.0224
Sweden 26.648 42.251 79.658 153.574 232.955 284.478 0.7195
UK 53.599 117.076 240.299 458.927 591.624 878.215 0.8227
EU Total 252.346 486.321 934.848 1.947.710 2.937.392 3.723.147 0.8471
Source: RIPE (1997)
Furthermore, local telephone calls to connect to ISPs in Europe are not free, unlike in North
America, where callers are allowed to make an unlimited amount of local calls under their basic
service costs. The cost of local calls is likely to rise in some countries, as former telecom
monopolies rebalance their rates in preparation for the opening of all services to competition in
January 1998. The reason being that they remain monopolists in regional telecom provision. On
12
the European level former government owned telecom enterprises are forced to compete. A good
example is the dramatic fall (50%) of telephone calls from the Netherlands to the US and France.
Rates to other countries have fallen at similar rates. However, at the local level, Dutch Telecom
(PTT Telecom) increased charges to guarantee its revenues. Knowledge of local customers is so
specific that foreign competitors do not have a strong incentive to break the local monopoly.
Furthermore, customers are so used to one (government owned) company offering
telecommunication services that  they are not willing to change to an unknown and most of the
time foreign telecommunication company.
Aside from hardware and access costs, there are several infrastructure issues that at present are
hindering the further diffusion of  Internet throughout Europe. The development of broadband
networks across Europe has been slow, and European leased-line prices remain anywhere from
two to ten times higher than equivalent prices in the US. It is likely that these constraints dampen
the growth of and access to the Internet. Table 2.5 estimates the number of Internet users on 1
January 1996. Since real figures are not available, we use an upper and a lower bound to compute
the number of users. The upper bound is determined by the number of PCS and the lower bound
by the number of CD-ROM players in each country. We estimate that the total number of Internet
users lies somewhere between 9.28 million and 21.98 million individuals. It is important to note
that if we assume that the number of CD-ROM players equals the number of modems and that
the number of users per modem is on average larger than one, the number of Internet users is
likely to be closer to the upper bound of almost 22 million than to the lower bound of
approximately 9 million users.
13
Table 2.5: Estimation of the Number of Internet Users, 01/01/1996
Country Lower Bound Upper Bound
Number of CD-ROM Players Number of PCS
Belgium 273.000 585.000
Denmark 270.000 720.000
France 1.320.000 3.300.000
Germany 2.860.000 4.940.000
Greece 105.000 350.000
Italy 1.200.000 2.800.000
Netherlands 610.000 1.525.000
Spain 805.000 2.415.000
Sweden 315.000 945.000
UK 1.540.000 4.400.000
Total EU-10 9.298.000 21.980.000
Source: RIPE (1997)
Table 2.6: Estimation of the Number and the Amount of Purchases on the Internet, 1996
Country Number of Purchases Amount of Money (US$)* **
Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound
Belgium 29.250 13.650 2.925.000 1.365.000
Denmark 36.000 13.500 3.600.000 1.350.000
France 165.000 66.000 16.500.000 6.600.000
Germany 247.000 143.000 24.700.000 14.300.000
Greece 17.500 5.250 1.750.000 525.000
Italy 140.000 60.000 14.000.000 6.000.000
Netherlands 76.250 30.500 7.625.000 3.050.000
Spain 120.750 40.250 12.075.000 4.025.000
Sweden 47.250 15.750 4.725.000 1.575.000
UK 220.000 77.000 22.000.000 7.700.000
Total EU-10 1.099.000 464.900 109.900.000 46.490.000
It is assumed that five percent of all users buys articles from the Internet. *
The average amount of money spent is assumed to be US$ 100.**
Once we have estimated the number of EU users, we can ‘guestimate’ the value of the EU
market. The Yankee Group Europe estimates that the total value of the access market, including
Internet access, local call charges, and second lines is about US$ 2.6 billion in Europe. This value
is expected to steadily increase to US$ 12.0 billion in 2001. We have estimated the value of the
Internet shopping market in EU countries in Table 2.6.  About five percent of all Internet users14
14
buy products online, purchasing roughly US$ 100 per person per year.  Again by using an upper15
and lower bound, we see that for the EU the number of sales lies approximately between almost
500.000 and 1.1 million. In 1996, online transactions were between US$ 50 million and US$ 1.1
billion.
In a study of Internet access by US companies, O'Reilly & Associates  report that 50% of large,16
25% of mid-sized and 8% of small US businesses had access to the Internet in 1996, for a total
of more than half a million establishments. Based on O'Reilly's findings, past growth curves and
the expected incorporation of the Internet into banking and credit card activity, ActivMedia17
predicts numbers will swell to 5.9 million, or 92% of US business establishments, by 2001. With
nearly every large US business connected and pressure to upgrade computer systems mounting,
the connectivity market will remain vibrant. Worldwide business access to the Web is expected
to grow at an even faster rate than in the more mature US market - from 1.3 million at the end
of 1996 to 8 million by 2001. Much of this growth will be in the Pacific Rim, followed by
Europe. India, South Africa, Israel, China and a few dozen other nations are beginning to develop
Internet infrastructure, but are not expected to blossom until the next century, when US and
Japanese penetration will be nearly complete. The growth of web generated sales on a worldwide
basis will be even more dramatic according to ActivMedia - from US$ 13.3 billion in 1996 to
US$ 314 billion in 2001.
The only major limiting factor in sight to curtail growth of the Internet and commercial websites
is whether the infrastructure development can keep up. Competitive pressures among web
developers and storage providers promise to keep the price of entry low. Cost cutting and
competitive pressures among marketeers continue to push more toward electronic marketing.
15
Hence, the further evolution of the IS can be stimulated by the development and provision of a
decent infrastructural framework and competition among all agents in the electronic commerce
market, e.g. service providers. This development might lead to a radical change in the way
consumers provide themselves with products. Consumers can travel all over the world in the
virtual environment of the Internet and buy products everywhere. The implications of this
changing attitude have strong effects on government policies. In the next section we discuss the
effects of this rapidly expanding process for the tax base.
16
A changing society: a changing tax system ... ?
VAT problems
Contemporary governments have increasing difficulties in collecting taxes and maintaining an
adequate  tax base. There are two main reasons for this perturbing phenomenon. The first relates
to the gradual world integration of economies; EU countries in particular face problems in this
regard. As the world becomes more integrated, and as capital and high-skilled labour can move
more easily and freely from high-tax countries to low-tax ones, a nation’s tax regime has to adapt
to some world standard because people and businesses can and will exploit differences in tax
regimes. A nation can attract capital and high-skilled labour through tax exemptions.  This can18
lead to in- and outflows of (human) capital. Countries with high tax rates such as Germany, Italy
and Japan can suffer from an outflow of capital and high-skilled labour. As capital and high-
skilled labour flow out of these countries the tax burden will be increasingly on medium- and
low-skilled labour.  This may eventually lead to an eroding tax base. At the same time the19
growth of electronic commerce accelerates this globalization of our economies by eliminating
borders between countries. This development makes it extremely difficult to trace and therefore
tax business transactions. Cordell (1997) argues in this respect: 
“[f]irms using information technologies can issue orders, manage inventories,
buy resources, design products, do research just about anywhere in the world.
Firms can bring together all factors of production to produce goods and services
anywhere on earth: global information and communication technologies mean
that corporations can have a virtual presence anywhere. With global brand
names the final product is produced anywhere; the final product is sold
17
anywhere.” (p. 2)20
Globalization also affects consumer choices. On the one hand, physical country borders no longer
determine the mobility of individuals. For example, residents from the Netherlands  travel to
Luxembourg to handle their finances while picking up petrol in Belgium. On the other hand, the
Internet boosts virtual mobility and globalization. Individuals surf the Internet from one country
to another and act like rational agents looking for the best price-quality ratio while taking into
account shipping costs. Table 3.1 gives an indication of the rapid evolution of the IS. An
indicator for the growth of Internet communication is approximated by examining the revenues
lost by telephone companies as a result of alternative communication mediums. This loss is
created by e.g. sending an e-mail rather than making a long-distance telephone call. The table
shows a dramatic increase in Internet telephony, e-mail and Internet fax over the next four years.
Table 3.1: The Internet’s Impact on International Telephony Revenues (US$ millions)
Carrier Country Estimated Losses to Losses to Losses to 
Internet Internet E-mail Internet Fax
Revenue Telephony
1997 2001 1997 2001 1997 2001 1997 2001
AT&T USA 9.422 9.272 5,18 231,75 37,02 72,87 1,36 44,82
Bezeq Israel 263 253 0,47 21,40 0,86 6,17 0,02 2,58
BT UK 1.366 1.455 1,21 69,99 8,22 24,79 0,18 8,35
Deutsche Telecom Germany 4.349 3.989 2,20 126,97 13,49 39,49 0,20 8,50
Embratel Brazil 481 764 0,47 59,40 4,27 28,37 0,10 11,07
Etisalat UAE 897 1.681 0,05 17,45 0,55 10,01 0,01 2,77
France Telecom France 1.725 1.249 1,20 64,05 9,27 24,54 0,15 5,73
Hongkong Tel. China 2.132 3.670 0,33 36,99 1,57 14,55 0,03 4,54
Kokusai Japan 1.936 2.644 2,82 194,17 22,40 86,20 0,41 26,17
Singapore Tel. Singapore 1.047 1.743 0,63 36,97 2,59 12,07 0,05 3,78
Stentor Canada 567 621 0,81 38,88 8,04 15,73 0,12 4,98
Telecom Italia Italy 2.037 1.938 1,22 105,15 6,65 43,55 0,14 12,69
Telkom S.A. South Africa 322 443 0,24 32,98 1,15 9,93 0,02 3,22
Telmex Mexico 1.629 1.389 0,64 25,95 4,27 10,74 0,17 6,98
Telstra Australia 1.109 1.694 1,77 114,76 10,84 38,17 0,25 14,77
VSNL India 585 1.665 0,07 27,04 0,86 25,77 0,02 8,97
Total 39.867 34.470 19,31 132,05 462,95 3,23 169,921203,90
Source: Telecom Daily, 8 September 1997
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In the EU a Value Added Tax (VAT) is the most common consumption tax, while the US uses
a system of sales taxes. In both the EU and the US, excise duties are levied on some goods such
as petrol, alcoholic drinks and cigarettes. The system of VAT works fairly well in the EU because
it uses intermediaries and it is incentive compatible. Intermediaries are involved in the entire
production process: from raw materials to the final product. These intermediaries are quite
willing to participate in the VAT system and to cooperate with tax authorities because they
charge the VAT to the next intermediary in the production process and, in the end, to the final
consumer. In addition, they are reimbursed by the tax authorities for the VAT they pay to an
upper chain intermediary. As such, an intermediary only pays VAT on the value he adds to the
product. Thus, the eventual burden is on the final consumer. In an international setting a customs
officer acts as the intermediary and hence taxes the incoming product at the border of the
particular country.
Table 3.2: VAT Diversion in the European Union
Country VAT Rates Specific Products
Low Normal Newspapers/ Art Journals CDS
Books
Austria 10/12/16 20.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Belgium 1/6/12 20.0 1.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Denmark - 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Finland 0/6/12/17 22.0 0.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
France 2.1/5.5 18.6 2.1 18.6 18.6 18.6
Germany 7 15.0 7.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Greece 3/8 18.0 3.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Ireland 2.5/10/12 21.0 2.5 21.0 21.0 21.0
Italy 4/9 19.0 4.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
3/6/12 15.0 3.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
6 17.5 6.0 17.5 17.5 17.5
5 17.0 5.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
3/6 16.0 3.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
0/12/21 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
- 17.5 0.0 17.5 17.5 17.5
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Electronic commerce threatens EU VAT revenues for two reasons.  For one, electronic21
commerce removes the intermediary from the production and distribution chain. A consumer
can linea recta contact the producer of the good he wants to purchase. A person wanting a
Salvador Dali painting no longer has to go to an art gallery but instead surfs the Internet to Dali’s
homepage and directly orders the desired painting. This leads to a fall in VAT revenues because
most of the intermediaries have disappeared. The second reason why electronic commerce
threatens VAT revenues is the fact that VAT rates in the EU are both as such very different and
divert on specific products. Table 3.2 shows VAT rates ranging from over 20% in Sweden,
Belgium and France to 15% in Germany. These large differences influence consumer behaviour
in the EU. Moreover, some countries exempt particular goods from VAT, e.g. in the UK VAT
on books and newspapers is zero. Consumers from the other EU member states have an incentive
to order their books from the UK using the Internet. In general, we observe that due to increasing
“consumer mobility” countries with high VAT rates may suffer from the increasing use of
electronic commerce. Their VAT revenues will fall, while countries with low rates of VAT will
observe larger revenues. In short, globalization and economic integration place forward the
condition for further integration and, more importantly, harmonisation of VAT rates.
To further illustrate the above tax problems, we make a distinction between goods flowing inside
the EU and goods coming in from outside Europe, i.e. intra EU trade and extra EU trade. Goods
coming in from outside Europe (extra EU trade) are handled  by a customs officer. His role is of
crucial importance: goods flowing into the EU are taxed according to the tax law of the country
of destination. Thus, if a leather coat is purchased online in the US by a Swedish citizen, the
customs officer at the Swedish border levies 25% VAT on the coat. Tax offices like Inland
Revenue claim that UK customs officers trace all packages crossing the UK borders. This may
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be true but seems unlikely due to the high volume of goods entering the UK and the
impractability of checking each one. Thus, it seems likely that many goods, such as compact
discs (CDS), are entering the UK from e.g. the US without VAT being levied.
Can the custom officers be the intermediary in the age of electronic commerce? For tangible
goods this is to a certain extent possible. “Higher-valued” goods are registered when entering the
EU, while other goods with lower values can flow freely amongst  EU countries. With respect
to services, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to trace their flow and hence levy taxes. With
services, the only opportunity to levy a tax is to trace where the final user of the service resides.
For this, voluntarily disclosure by end users is required. If producers are the end users of services,
then  this does not pose a problem since producers will be willing to disclose the services they
receive because they can pass on the VAT charges. If the final user is an individual consumer,
VAT revenues will fall as they try and avoid the payment of taxes.
Another option possible to obtain the foregone tax revenues on services is to shift the
responsibility of disclosure to the producer of the service. In this case, the producer charges VAT
directly, by increasing the price of the service by the relevant VAT rate. From a legal perspective
this is no problem for producers residing in the EU because they can shift the tax burden.
Producers residing in the US, however, run into problems. With the US sales tax system it is
impossible to shift the tax burden. Thus, a US citizen does not pay a sales tax on services because
if the government announces a sales tax on services this will worsen the competitive position of
US firms. In other words, it would give US firms a comparative disadvantage. It is therefore not
surprising that IBM has proposed a duty free Internet, stating that:
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At a time when the U.S. Treasury and the White House have taken the more
prudent route of advocating no new taxes on commercial Internet activities and
are encouraging policies designed to foster its rapid expansion and development,
proponents of the “bit tax” have stepped to the fore as the only group to be going
in the complete opposite direction. A number of U.S. state and local movements
towards taxation have reversed position, some due to pressure from the business
and user community (i.e., Tacoma, Washington), others as a consequence of
further study (i.e., Florida). Still others have taken the positive approach of
seeking to foster Internet related activities in their jurisdictions (New York) by
adopting Internet friendly tax laws and regulations, and others have adopted
resolutions advocating support of the Clinton Administration's view (Georgia).22
The argument used by the Clinton administration is basically that it is too difficult to trace and
localise the Internet user. If a sales tax is levied on US services, they would become much less
attractive to foreign consumers because they are simply too expensive. The effect of a duty free
Internet is advantageous to US firms relative to EU firms because EU firms still face the VAT
system while the goods and services of US firms are entirely tax free.23
So far we have discussed how tax revenues will suffer from the increasing use of electronic
commerce. In the next section we discuss and evaluate different methods to prevent the tax base
from further erosion in the IS.
Fighting tax erosion
Taxing electronic commerce - and in particular a bit tax - is a very controversial and hotly
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debated issue on the agenda of both large computer manufacturers (e.g. IBM),  government24
agencies, e.g. the European Commission,  and scientists.  Those opposing a tax on electronic25  26
commerce argue that it is “a tax on the IS” and runs the risk of slowing down the IS’s evolution.
However, in our view, the only way to appropriately dismiss such a tax is to do so on the basis
of research - i.e. through macro econometric methods or models. Cordell (1997) argues that a tax
on gasoline did not slow down the development of the automobile industry. We have to consider
such statements with a certain amount of caution, because the implicit assumption is an inelastic
demand for cars. Whether the demand for accessing the Internet and more importantly the
demand for using the Internet is inelastic remains an open question.  In this section we introduce27
three proposals to fight tax erosion. In order to build up a comprehensive analysis of these
proposals we illustrate a business model to show the opportunities for taxation. Figure 3.1 shows
the basic business model for the Internet with all key players involved. These players are
Network Providers (NPs), ISPs, Users, Web site Internet Shop, Payment Providers (PPs) and
Software Architects (SAs).
Figure 3.1: An Internet Business Model
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We can identify the following six flows of money and services:
1 The User or potential Internet Shop customer pays a fee to the ISP who supplies an
Internet Connection. This gives the user access to various Internet services such as
WWW, e-mail etc.
2 The User visits a Web Site or Internet Shop and decides to purchase goods and/or
services. To pay for items, the user obtains a payment system from a financial institution -
the PP (bank). The PPs also provide various services related to the system.
3 The Web Site Internet Shop purchases a permanent Internet connection or space on the
ISP's computers from the ISP.
4 To provide the User with access to the Internet, the ISP purchases a set amount of
bandwidth from a NP.
5 SAs supply the Internet Shop with the software required to enable connection to an ISP
and to allow customers to browse the shop. 
6 If customers buy their products with a e.g. credit card, there is a revenue flow from the
PP to the Internet Shop and a revenue flow from the Internet Shop to the PP to deal with
commission cost.
The first proposal is for the ISP to become the new tax intermediary. The Internet user or
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potential Internet customer, pays a fee to the ISP who supplies an Internet connection. This gives
the user access to various Internet services such as the Web, e-mail etc. Since ISPs know the
identity of the user, they could take the responsibility of keeping track of all financial transactions
a particular user makes. This is already feasible from a technical point of view: ISPs can become
the new intermediaries because they can perform identity checks on new commercial users and
can account for Internet Protocol numbers (IP numbers). To be able to account for IP numbers
they need NPs. NPs are useful and necessary in two ways. First, telecommunication bandwidth
is in one sense a distribution chain and large bandwidth use is an indicator of commercial
activity. Second, as distributors of IP numbers they can ensure proper accountability for IP
numbers they issue. Once the user is identified the ISP can keep track of all transactions this
particular user makes. All these transactions can be put on a specified bill the user receives every
month. Once this happens it is very easy to levy VAT on the products the individual has
purchased; it is similar to the telephone invoices  received each month. There is one problem
with this system however. It is currently not possible to trace IP numbers because they are
assigned randomly. In the near future it is possible that every single subscriber to an ISP will
receive a personal IP number, similar to the case of credit card numbers. 
An advantage of this proposal is that the VAT system remains unchanged and unchallenged.
However, a disadvantage of imposing VAT on the Internet use is the increasing cost of using the
Internet. These higher cost could lead to a slow down of the growth of the Internet, or even to an
absolute decrease in the number of users. This can have negative effects on the further evolution
of the Internet in particular and the IS in general. The exact effects of the levying of VAT on
Internet transactions are unknown, but are currently being investigated at the Maastricht
Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).  In addition, the previous28
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section of this paper maps all features of the Internet market.
The second option is to appoint the financial community as intermediary in Cyberworld.
However, until now financial institutions were never pushed into the role of authority and they
do not trample to enter this role of control.  Two options are available that allow the financial29
community to act as tax intermediary. For one, using electronic money (e-cash) for all electronic
commerce transactions would allow VAT to be charged on the e-cash and incorporated in the
price of this new form of money e.g., one unit of e-cash incorporates a certain percentage of
VAT. Two, credit card companies can levy VAT on all transactions their customers make on the
Internet. PPs can introduce e-cash for all electronic commerce transactions and in this way
monitor all transactions individuals make on the Internet. PPs can simply monitor all transactions
their customers make on the Internet and levy VAT on the final bill. 
A bottle neck with having financial institutions act as the intermediary is that in order to levy
VAT on e-cash or a credit card transaction both the financial institution - the bank or the credit
card company - and the customer have to reside in the same country. This is not always the case.
This problem can be easily solved, however, because a credit card needs to be fed from the
customer’s home country. If we are able to trace this feeding we can tax at the source. This taxing
at the initial source is the general reasoning behind the idea Tobin (1984) launched for raising
an international uniform tax on all spot conversions of one currency into another.  Like taxing30
electronic commerce, the Tobin tax is criticized because of its implementation difficulties. The
implementation problem is characterized by the public goods nature of the tax. This implies two
things: unilateral action is totally ineffective and concerted action will be confronted with the
free-rider problem.31
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Upon closer examination of Figure 3.1 we observe that Web Site Internet Shops can also play
a role in the collection of VAT. Since tax authorities have full access to those parts of a website
containing transaction logs and financial data, it would be quite feasible to implement payment
of tax directly from the business website to the tax-authorities website. Furthermore, in
developing internationally accepted identification and authentication standards applicable to
financial transactions, SAs can build a system, embedded in popular web browsers such as
Netscape Explorer or Microsoft Explorer, to enable reporting of financial transactions.32
The final option we consider is the method of last resort: the bit tax. The bit tax is basically a tax
on the volume of the transaction (the number of bits sent) rather than the value of the transaction.
The bit tax is equal to an excise duty: a taxation on the use of the information superhighway’s
bandwidth. The original bit tax proposal was made by Cordell and Ide (1994) in a Club of Rome
report.  They argue that the existing tax structure on value would no longer make sense in the33
information society and propose a bit tax as a replacement for VAT on information technology
goods and services, rather than as an additional tax. Furthermore, they argue that VAT is heavily
based on the material inputs that occur at different stages of the manufacturing process and is,
as such,  not well-suited to ‘intangible’ services. In the case of information and communication
services it is very difficult to talk in any real or meaningful way about a tax on value added. A
telephone call is currently priced and taxed in relation to distance and time and has no
relationship to the possible value of the communication. Therefore, we need the bit rather than
the second as the fundamental unit of measure to minimise the leakage and erosion in the
contemporary tax system. Cordell (1997) argues that it is an easily administrated tax on each
digital bit of information. Furthermore he recognizes:
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“[w]hether the digital bit is part of a foreign exchange transaction, a business
teleconference, an Internet e-mail of file transfer, electronic check clearance or
an ATM transaction, each bit is a physical manifestation of the new economy at
work.” (p. 9)34
Taxation on that basis might save small-scale users money while increasing the tax burden on
large-scale users. The bit tax would be paid by individual users and levied by their online ISPs.
In addition, the bit tax should be a generic tax exerted on all electronic traffic and be introduced
on a world-wide basis to avoid distortions. The common rate of taxation is set by Cordell
randomly at 0.000001 cent per bit. A major advantage of the bit tax, although it taxes volume
instead of value, is that the collection will cause less distortions to the economy than most other
direct or indirect taxes. Collected by ISPs or NPs the revenues will flow directly to the national
tax authorities of the respective country, omitting the problem of residence.
Although the exact implementation of such a tax is not yet clear, the general idea of a tax on
information from the point of view of an eroding tax base and the changing society is certainly
worth considering. Furthermore, the tax revenues could be directed towards improving access
to the Internet, educating individuals to become acquainted with the Internet and providing
additional needed bandwidth.
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Concluding remarks
The idea of taxing electronic commerce has been met with a barrage of negative reactions on the
side of policy makers, industry and consumers. Nevertheless, over the past year, the issue of an
eroding tax base linked to the development of electronic networks replacing physical ones has
grown in importance. Although the exact implementation is very hard to accomplish, the general
idea of a tax on information from the point of view of an eroding tax base and the changing
society, certainly is worthwhile considering. Furthermore, the tax revenues can be moved directly
towards improving access to the Internet, educating individuals to become acquainted with the
Internet and providing the additional needed bandwidth.
Building a business model gives us the advantage of the feasibility of the implementation of a
tax on electronic commerce. We have seen that the implementation problems can be overcome
by either enforce ISPs or PPs as tax collectors. ISPs can monitor all transactions their customers
make. Hence, they can put VAT on these transactions. ISP customers receive at the end of the
month not only the bill for access but also a bill including VAT regarding the transactions they
made. PPs can by either e-cash or credit card numbers trace the transactions of Internet users. E-
cash can be taxed ex ante if it is not possible to locate the user, otherwise users receive an e-cash
bill including VAT at the end of each month. Furthermore, a credit card company can record all
transactions and announce VAT on it. Finally, as a method of last resort, the bit tax can be
implemented. Now, ISPs keep record of all bits flowing over the Internet.
Next to this, we have to improve access to the information society by stimulating people and
making people aware of the fact that ones they miss entrance to the IS they fall behind forever.
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This awareness can be created in providing proper training and education programmes. In
addition, the cost of entering the information society have to fall dramatically in order to
guarantee equal chances for all citizens. On this view of things, a tax on electronic commerce can
turn out to be a useful tool in redistributing income and giving people a ticket to enter a new age.
In addition, such a tax can provide the economy with extra needed bandwidth and the
development of a comprehensive Internet.
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